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Device-to-Device (D2D) communications have received exceptional atten-
tion nowadays due to the overabundance number of applications and ser-
vices. Therefore, D2D is expected to be a vital technical component in Inter-
net of Things and to play a significant role with the next generation 5G. On
the other hand, due to the growth demand of D2D, it becomes an ideal tar-
get for attackers. Moreover, the rapid rise in mobile capabilities opens the
door to the cyber criminals that explore new avenues for malware attacks.
In spite of the fact that the literature proposed security schemes for mal-
ware attacks. However, the research field is still immature and unexplored
in depth due to the fast evolution of malware. Accordingly, malware attacks
formalize security risk that threatens the mobile network. A noteworthy
concern is that the malware attacks are going on at a rate far surpassing
the development of safety techniques.
The fundamental goal of our thesis is to propose a novel secure,
energy-aware stochastic routing protocol based on a game-theoretic ap-
proach for security improvement against malware attacks in Device-to-
Device network. The proposed protocol considers for the security require-
ment, as well as the energy system constraints. As a first step toward
thwarting the success of the malware attacks, we try to hinder the malware
infection by detecting the malware before it infects the targeted devices.
xi
ABSTRACT xii
Moreover, the proposed routing protocol considers the attacker’s behavior
and the computation of decision makers’ strategies.
The effectiveness of the proposed routing protocol has been eval-
uated using network simulator. Through extensive simulations, we have
validated the effectiveness of proposed protocol by comparing its perfor-
mance with the traditional routing protocols and with another strategic
customized protocol. Results are presented to illustrate the efficiency of the
proposed routing protocol regarding the detection rate and overall expected
payoff compared with traditional routing protocols and another strategic
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This chapter presents the thesis direction, mentions the motivation behind
choosing the research problem, including the research question, objectives,
contributions and structure of this argument.
Section 1.1 describes the motivations and the challenges behind
this research. Section 1.2 explores the problem statement in particular,
including the research question while Section 1.3 discusses the research
aims and objectives. Section 1.4 identifies the significant contributions of
the researcher and her supervisors to this research and the related publi-
cations conducted under the work in this thesis. Finally, Section 1.5 briefly
summarizes the structure of the thesis.
1.1 Research Motivation
Device-to-Device (D2D) communication has been broadly recognized as a
promising component of the next generation 5G cellular networks [15].
Notwithstanding, D2D communications have received significant consid-
1
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eration both in industry and academia due to the growing number of appli-
cations and services that can leverage proximity oriented communication,
including local services, content sharing, gaming, group multicast, context-
aware applications [33].
On the other hand, due to the intense demand and the benefits
of D2D communication in various and significant areas, new severe secu-
rity threats are expected on Device-to-Device network. Accordingly, this
prevents practically a successful deployment of D2D communications. Re-
searchers focus much more on the connectivity on D2D. However, the se-
curity issue needs more consideration for practical applications. Like this,
the problem of D2D security is still less addressed in both academic and
industrial fields [13].
Furthermore, the growth in computation, sensor and communica-
tion capabilities of mobile devices make us move towards advanced mobile
security threats. The mobile malware attack is one of the security threat
that formalizes a serious security risk that threatens to retard the large-
scale reproduction of wireless applications [38].
Malware threats rocketed on mobile devices and can bypass the
security mechanisms of the devices using advanced techniques [71]. Fur-
thermore, the gap between security systems and real world security is only
growing bigger [9]. Although the security schemes proposed to isolate the
infected devices and prevent malicious attacks, e.g., DoS, the isolating and
the tracking of the infected devices are still challenging [48].
Motivated by all previous trends, lightweight, efficient countermea-
sures, and designs to hinder the mobile malware infection are highly re-
quired. To solve these security problems in a D2D network, a novel secure
and energy-aware routing protocol based on game theory is proposed in
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this thesis. This proposed routing protocol studies the interaction between
the network and the attacker for security enhancement and to hinder the
malware attack.
1.2 Problem Statement
Due to the explosive growth in demand for Device-to-Device Communica-
tion in large areas, it has become an attractive target for attacks. Accord-
ingly, new severe security threats are expected on Device-to-Device net-
work such as inference attack and DDoS [16], [78].
In fact, the growth in computation, sensor, and communication ca-
pabilities of mobile devices makes us move towards advanced mobile secu-
rity threats. Also, cyber security is moving from infrastructure to advanced
mobile infrastructure-less threat [49].
Recently, the attackers have been focusing their efforts on mobile
platforms. There has been a sharp rise in the number of reported new
mobile OS vulnerabilities [3] from 115 in 2009 to 163 in 2010 (42% more
vulnerabilities).
In 2015, there were 1.966.324 registered notifications of attempted
malware infections that aimed to steal money via on-line access to bank ac-
counts. The annual statistics for 2015 are based on data received between
November 2014 and October 2015 [5]. Therefore, mobile malware attacks
represent a serious security risk that threatens to retard the large-scale
reproduction of wireless applications [38].
Furthermore, the malware attacks rocketed on mobile devices can
bypass the security mechanisms of the devices using advanced techniques
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[71] as well as the tracking and isolating of infected devices remains very
challenging [48]. However, the existing security schemes for malware at-
tacks are not efficient [48].
A noteworthy concern is that the malware attacks are happening
at a rate far surpassing the evolution of security techniques. The gap be-
tween security systems and real world security is just becoming bigger [9].
However, the problem of Device-to-Device security is still less addressed in
both academic and industrial fields [16].
As a result, the mobile malware threats are soon to be considered a
hot topic. To accomplish secure, intelligent Device-to-Device Communica-
tion in the future, research issues need to be addressed [16].
As a first step toward thwarting the success of the malware attacks,
we seek to mitigate the mobile infection. Motivated by all previous trends,
lightweight [16] countermeasures hinder the mobile malware infection are
highly required [48].
1.2.1 Research Question
How to hinder a malware attack during the infection phase in multi-hop
Device-to-Device network using a lightweight energy-aware solution?
The traditional routing protocols like (DSR) [36] and (AODV) [62] establish
the network connectivity from the source node to target node using the
single shortest path for message delivery. These protocols utilize the single
path and are typically prone to failure or malicious attacks and with the
emphasis on cloud computing and distributed computing, the network is
further exposed to security attacks.
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Accordingly, these deterministic approaches are not flexible for the
variable dynamic network conditions [16]. In addition, the operational con-
straints of the devices and the security requirements are not considered
necessary for the D2D network.
Question: Is it possible to design an intelligent and secure routing protocol
that can distribute the data traffic in such an intelligent way to achieve
security, considering the resource constraints through optimal routes
regarding malware detection efficiency and energy awareness?
In this thesis, a secure and energy-aware stochastic routing protocol has
been designed based on a game-theoretic approach for D2D network. The
proposed routing protocol computes several routes between the source-target
node pairs, then formulates the routing probabilities, which optimize the
security regarding malware detection efficiency as well as consider the en-
ergy constraints of the devices for the route availability, network lifetime,
and long-term connectivity.
Accordingly, routes that are created have probabilities within a set
of constraints. Then, the secure and energy-aware route is selected stochas-
tically from these routes to forward the messages.
1.3 Research Objectives
The principle goal of this research is to present a novel secure and energy-
aware routing protocol based on the game theoretical model for security
enhancement in Device-to-Device network considering both the security re-
quirements and the system energy constraints.
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Another goal is to evaluate the performance of the proposed proto-
col using a packet level network simulator compared to other traditional
protocols. All the more succinctly, our goals are summarized as follows.
• To propose a novel end-to-end probabilistic energy-aware routing pro-
tocol based on game theory for D2D communications for security im-
provement by mitigating mobile malware infection. Malware detec-
tion is considered by investigating the mobile malware detection tech-
niques residing on devices to detect the malware before it infects the
device.
• To compute several routes between the source-target node pair, then
investigate the selection of the optimal end-to-end path. The optimal
routes are identified regarding malware detection efficiency and con-
sidering network lifetime by balancing the energy load among all a
set of computed routes.
• To evaluate and validate the effectiveness of the proposed routing pro-
tocol by comparing the simulation results of the proposed protocol
with other non-strategic traditional protocols and another strategic
customized protocol in case of three different attack cases.
1.4 Thesis Contributions
Based on the research objectives mentioned in the previous section, the
researcher and her supervisors have proposed a novel end-to-end secure
stochastic routing protocol based on a game-theoretic model for D2D com-
munications that improves the security and considers the system energy
constraints. The following are the thesis contributions.
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• A new end-to-end secure routing protocol based on a game-theoretic
model for D2D communications has been proposed that takes security
defense routing decisions strategically.
The proposed routing protocol computes several routes between the
source-target node pair, then formulates the probabilities which opti-
mize the security regarding malware detection efficiency and energy
awareness.
Accordingly, paths that are created have probabilities within a set
of constraints. Then, the secure and energy-aware route is selected
stochastically from these routes to forward the messages.
• The proposed routing protocol considers the energy constraints of the
devices to guarantee the path availability, and this improves the net-
work survivability by maintaining the network connectivity.
• The proposed routing protocol studies the interaction between the at-
tacker and the defender as a zero-sum repeated game taking into ac-
count the attacker’s behavior. It has investigated a dynamic scheme
regarding calculating malware detection rate and new malware be-
haviors.
• The performance and effectiveness of the proposed routing protocol
have been evaluated through simulations using network simulator
Omnet++.
Through extensive simulations, the performance of the proposed rout-
ing protocol has been validated. The simulation results have been il-
lustrated, demonstrating its effectiveness and how it outperforms the
traditional routing protocols and other strategic customized protocol
regarding overall expected payoff and detection rate in case of three
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different attacks distribution.
1.4.1 Published Papers
The papers that have been published in this research [28], [27]:
• "Malware-defense Secure Routing in Intelligent Device-to-Device Com-
munications".
• "Mitigating Malware Attacks via Secure Routing in Intelligent Device-
to-Device Communications".
1.5 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.
• Chapter 2 describes the background of the research problem that is
presented in this thesis. This chapter presents an overall survey of
D2D communication security research by providing a detailed expla-
nation of the D2D security requirements, vulnerabilities of the mo-
bile devices, malware attacks, and evaluation of the existed security
schemes.
For the research question and objectives considered in this thesis,
chapter 2 provides an adequate background to understand the re-
search problem and the idea. This chapter reviews the detailed state-
of-the-art regarding game theoretic approach in relevant research fields
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that combines four areas: security, routing, D2D network, and intru-
sion detection.
• Chapter 3 presents the proposed game theoretic protocol for security
in Device-to-Device network. It describes the examined system model,
attack model, and game model.
The proposed secure routing protocol based on game theoretic ap-
proach is discussed by setting the system model and its components,
including the attacker model and presenting the utility functions for
both the defender and attacker.
• Chapter 4 describes and discusses the simulations of the results of the
proposed routing protocol. It discusses the evaluation, interpretation
of the results against the background of the relevant literature in 3
different attack cases.
The performance of the proposed secure routing protocol is evaluated
regarding the overall expected payoff and the detection rate. Also, a
critical assessment is carried out to compare the results for three rout-
ing protocols (SCP, DSR, AODV) in the case of three different attack
cases with the proposed secure routing protocol.
The performance of the optimal defense strategy for the proposed pro-
tocol regarding the detection rate of the malicious messages has been
evaluated. The effectiveness of the proposed routing protocol is com-
pared with other non-strategic protocols DSR and AODV as well as
with another strategic customized protocol.
• Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this thesis explaining the results and
findings and highlights the main contributions of the thesis on the
research objectives. It defines the limitations of the research and the
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main avenues for future research orientation in the field of security
for Device-to-Device communications. Finally, some suggestions for
future work are given.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
This chapter provides the adequate background to understand the research
problem presented in this thesis and reviews the detailed state-of-the-art
regarding game theoretic approach in relevant research fields.
In Section 2.1, the fundamentals of the characteristics of Device-
to-Device Communication and the Device-to-Device applications are intro-
duced. It also mentions the security requirements needed in Device-to-
Device Communications and emphasizes the security issues and the chal-
lenges with Device-to-Device Communications.
Section 2.2 gives an overview of the game theory approach and its
importance. It also investigates the game theoretic applications for security
and intrusion detection in the network.
13
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Figure 2.1: D2D communication application scenarios [2]
2.1 Device-to-Device Networks
2.1.1 Device-to-Device Characteristics
Due to the recent rapid growth in demand for the mobile communication
network, new technologies are proposed to improve throughput, commu-
nication delay and computational offloading [32]. Device-to-Device (D2D)
Communication has been widely recognized as a promising and innovative
feature of the next generation 5G cellular networks [15].
Due to D2D Communication manifold advantages, the traditional
approach has gained much interest nowadays. D2D Communication pro-
vides high bit-rate, low communication delay and computational offloading
as well as high throughput in the cell area [33].
D2D Communication is proposed as a mean of gathering the prox-
imity, hop gains and reuse [33]. Furthermore, it enables direct commu-
nication between two mobile devices on a cellular network without pass-
ing through a base station or core network. The communication can occur
on the mobile spectrum (e.g., Long Term Evolution (LTE)) or unlicensed
spectrum (e.g., IEEE 802.11) [15], such that the D2D short range provides
higher data rate and better energy efficiency than cellular technologies.
D2D is categorized into three exemplary types according to infras-
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tructure and involved network entities [73] as shown in figure 2.1.
• In-Coverage: where D2D Communications between devices are con-
trolled by the Base Station (BS).
• Relay-Coverage: where user devices exist at the cellular edge. D2D
Communication extends the coverage of the BS through relaying the
device information through the other covered devices.
• Out-Coverage: where the D2D Communication takes place in case of
absence of the network coverage such that D2D Communication looks
like MANET.
Also, the inherent characteristics of a regular D2D Communication
are unlike the other networks which include network entities to carry out
some network functions. Accordingly, there are certain features of a stan-
dard D2D Communication include the following [16].
• Heterogeneity of devices: Devices are different in functionality and
applications.
• Device cooperation: Any device can communicate anytime in a coop-
erative manner with any other device.
• Device constraints: Devices have resource constraints like battery
life, memory, and processing power.
• Self-organization and self-configuration: Devices in D2D networks
have self-organizing capabilities and devices can determine the con-
figuration parameters autonomously.
• Unpredictable mobility: D2D networks consist of highly mobile and
stationary devices. Mobile devices can be rapidly repositioned and
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Figure 2.2: Factors for multihop D2D communications [55]
may get disconnected from the network, which causes unpredictable
changes in the network topology.
• Multi-hop communication: Devices have low power transmitters and
receivers. Accordingly, each device can act as a router and cooperate
to share, collect, and relay information over multiple hops.
D2D communication between devices can be directly or typically
be multiple hops in nature as in (IoT), the device will communicate with
each other independently without any centralized control. In multi-hop
D2D network, the devices cooperate to share, collect, and relay information
in a multi-hop manner. Figure 2.2 summarizes the major critical factors
required for the multi-hop D2D communication systems [55].
Due to the recent market demand for new services such as context-
aware and proximity services, the industry is exploiting new use cases and
new business models. These use cases are based on D2D communication as
shown in figure 2.3 [15], e.g., local services, content sharing, gaming, group
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Figure 2.3: Use-cases of D2D communications [15]
multicast, and context-aware applications. Therefore, D2D is expected to
be a vital technical component in Internet of Things (IoT) [16] and will play
a significant role with the next generation 5G.
2.1.2 Device-to-Device Applications
D2D communications have received significant recent attention both in in-
dustry and academia due to the growing number of applications and ser-
vices that can leverage proximity oriented communication, including perva-
sive healthcare monitoring, social networking, public safety and rescue and
location-based services [15]. Furthermore, D2D communication supports
new models based on the proximity of the devices, e.g., social networking
applications and facilitates new types of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) services [15].
The importance of multi-hop D2D communication is realized in the
disaster scenarios and public safety communication where the communi-
cation infrastructure is physically damaged, and the communication is en-
abled among devices independent of the network operator [55]. However,
relay by mobile terminals (smartphones, laptops, tablet PCs) could deliver
messages through multi-hop D2D communication. Furthermore, the de-
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Figure 2.4: D2D application in Disaster Relief [55]
centralized infrastructure-less multi-hop communication plays an essential
role in the disaster salvage and emergency cases [55]. Relay by mobile ter-
minals can be the unique option for emergency situations and in designing
systems for disaster recovery, where there is no communication infrastruc-
ture [55] as shown in figure 2.4.
Additionally, it can be applied for commercial purposes (e.g., adver-
tisement, coupons, and flyer distribution) by delivering advertisements to
subscribers when they are in the surrounding area instead of the tradi-
tional methods such as emails [55]. Another important application is the
sharing of information (i.e., exchange of private message, document) among
groups in places outside the cellular coverage (e.g., mountains, island, mil-
itary domain). Additionally, D2D Communication facilitates the sharing
of information among groups of people where the mobile communication is
highly congested [55].
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2.1.3 Classifications of Routing protocols for Intelligent D2D
Communications
D2D communication between devices can be directly or typically be multi-
ple hops in nature as in (IoT), the devices will communicate with each other
independently without any centralized control. In the multi-hop D2D net-
work, the devices cooperate to share, collect, and relay information in a
multi-hop manner, thus performing routing functions.
Traditional routing protocols, e.g., DSR and AODV determine the
shortest path taken from messages traversing between a source node and
target node. However, these deterministic approaches are not flexible for
the unpredictable dynamic network conditions. In addition, the operational
constraints of the devices [16] and the security requirements are not consid-
ered necessary for D2D network. Accordingly, the communication between
devices should be achieved through efficient routing algorithms, which sup-
port energy efficiency and scalability.
As a result, intelligent algorithms are needed for the routing pro-
cesses to accomplish an end-to-end communication between devices. The
classifications of the intelligent routing algorithms on D2D characteristics
are as follows [16].
• Stochastic/Probabilistic Algorithms: These algorithms have individ-
ual optimization objectives, and formulate routing probabilities that
optimize the criteria of interest. These routing algorithms are suited
for the dynamic network conditions and the unpredictable mobility
of the devices and take into consideration the operational constraints
than the deterministic approaches. Also, the traditional determinis-
tic routing protocols are single-path routing protocols that leave the
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route at the risk of interception as it is predictable and easy to be
eavesdropped and determined by the attacker.
Examples of these algorithms are proposed for optimization objectives
in the wireless multi-hop network [65], [43], and another set of pro-
posed protocols based on game theory approach to security problems
[18], [19], [17], [67].
• Bio-inspired Algorithms: These algorithms address the challenges in
large-scale networks by considering the heterogeneity of devices, de-
centralized and self-organized systems, and the resource constraints.
Examples of these algorithms include swarm intelligence-based algo-
rithms proposed for preventing a DoS attack such as the ant colony
optimization (ACO) [37] and the human immune system [61].
• Hierarchical Algorithms: These algorithms are classified to tree-based
and cluster-based algorithms [44]. Some features in these algorithms
limit their general use for D2D communications [16].
• Context-aware Algorithms: These algorithms use the gathered con-
text and information about the status of the devices within the net-
work and select the best routes based on the collected information.
In this thesis, we have chosen the Stochastic/Probabilistic algo-
rithm in the design of our intelligent proposed routing protocol of multi-hop
D2D communication. Since the traditional routing protocol is a single-path
routing, which relays the packets over a single path from the source de-
vice to target device, this is considered a single point of failure. Once the
route is compromised, all the connections will be interrupted. Accordingly,
this routing protocol cannot solve the challenges that are raised from in-
herent characteristics of D2D communications [16]. Furthermore, these
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single-path protocols leave the routes at the risk of the eavesdropping and
interception because these routes will be predictable and easy to be deter-
mined by the attacker.
The stochastic routing algorithms have optimization objectives and
are better suited for D2D communication rather than the other determin-
istic traditional approaches [16]. These algorithms explore the existence
of multiple paths between the source and target node pair and select the
path stochastically from those paths to forward the packets to minimize the
predictability of the decision by the attacker.
Therefore, this algorithm can support the security requirements,
consider the unpredictable mobility and the constraints of devices, as well
as improve the network survivability by maintaining the network connec-
tivity.
2.1.4 Security Requirements in D2D Communications
The authors of [73] have identified the critical security requirements in
D2D communication recently and have evaluated the existed security schemes.
The security requirements for the D2D communication system should achieve
Confidentiality and Integrity, Authentication, Privacy, Non-Repudiation,
Revocable, Availability, and Dependability.
On the other hand, they have investigated the existing security
schemes that have been developed for D2D communications since 2000,
which are classified to four primary design purposes about security as fol-
lows: Authentication and Key Management, Secure Routing, Access Con-
trol, and Physical Layer Security.
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2.1.5 Security Challenges in Device-to-Device Communications
Due to sufficient demand and benefits of D2D communication in different
areas, new severe security threats are expected on D2D networks. Further-
more, the direct connections between devices via short-range technologies
(i.e., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth) are more vulnerable to security threats [49]. There-
fore, D2D communication has become an attractive target for attackers due
to its explosive growth in demand of D2D in vast areas.
Despite the importance of the security requirements needed in D2D
communication [73], the security requirements for multi-hop D2D commu-
nication depend on the type of the application. While some applications
may require less security, other applications may require more security
(i.e., private message exchange, distributing important documents). As a
result, the security concerns in the multi-hop D2D communication should
be addressed to support all the possible applications [55]. However, the
academia and industry have not yet investigated these security issues of
the D2D communication seriously [13].
In fact, the impressive growth in computation, sensor and commu-
nication capabilities of mobile devices opens the door to the cyber criminals
that explore new avenues for mobile malware attacks and makes us move
towards advanced mobile security threats [49]. Additionally, mobile de-
vices are prone to new severe threats [8] as they are capable of initiating
advanced security attacks without passing through a powerful centralized
entity. It is worth mentioning that cyber security is moving from infras-
tructure to advanced mobile infrastructure-less threat [49].
As a result, mobile devices are considered an attractive launching
pad for mobile malware attacks [8]. Recently, the attackers have been fo-
cusing their efforts on mobile platforms. There has been a sharp rise in
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Figure 2.5: Mobile vulnerabilities by Operating System [4]
the number of reported new mobile OS vulnerabilities [3] from 115 in 2009
to 163 in 2010 (42% more vulnerabilities). In the same trend, researchers
give increasing attention to the security issues. Recently, iOS vulnerabili-
ties have recorded for the greatest number 71 of mobile vulnerabilities as
shown in figure 2.5, with research often fueled by the interest to jailbreak
devices or gain unauthorized access to install malware [4].
In 2015, there were 1.966.324 registered notifications of attempted
malware infections that aimed to steal money via on-line access to bank ac-
counts. The annual statistics for 2015 are based on data received between
November 2014 and October 2015 [5] as shown in figure 2.6 and figure 2.7.
These graphs demonstrate the number of malicious applications doubled
in 6 months to reach 700.000 malware for Android in June 2015 [10].
Therefore, mobile malware attacks are becoming a significant threat
to the mobile wireless network. Mobile malware attacks formalize a seri-
ous security risk that threatens to retard the large-scale reproduction of
wireless applications [38]. Additionally, mobile malware can disseminate
offensive content or provide unauthorized access to the personal and finan-
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Figure 2.6: Number of users attacked by financial malware, 2014-2015 [5]
Figure 2.7: Malware Threat Growth [10]
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Figure 2.8: Mobile Device Cloud [63]
cial information (e.g., mobile banking, private data, and SMS). Further-
more, these attacks sometimes attempt to disrupt the normal functions of
the devices [38], alter the network traffic, or even kill the device or launch
epidemic attacks. However, this research field is still immature and unex-
plored in depth [16], [55].
As a result, the mobile malware threats are to be considered a hot
topic in the next future. Researchers have recognized the security threat
of these attacks in a mobile wireless network. Accordingly, they have been
studying the maximum damage of malware attacks taking the dynamic
behavior of the malware and the evolution of future malware into consid-
eration [38], [39].
Researchers focus much more on the connectivity. However, the
security issue has to receive more attention for practical applications [55].
Researchers have been studying the malware spread and propagation within
the wireless network and cellular networks. However, no studies are con-
ducted so far on disconnected distributed mobile networks such as Mobile
Device Cloud (MDC) [48], [49], [63] as shown in figure 2.8. Sophisticated
malicious attacks such as targeted attack and epidemic attack are intro-
duced in MDC, where the infected devices are coordinated together forming
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a mobile distributed botnet. Once MDC is infected, the attacker launches
malicious attacks from the infected nodes. Malware attacks leverage the
advantages of the D2D communications in MDC via short range wireless
technology in masking the malicious infection and increase the propagation
rate [49].
On the other hand, the mobility of the devices can increase the mal-
ware infection and propagation rate. Also, applying the prevention tech-
niques that hinder the malware infection expensive in regards to energy
and time. Accordingly, the tracking and the isolation of the malware at-
tacks are very challenging [48]. Therefore, to accomplish secure and intel-
ligent D2D Communication in the future, research issues need to be ad-
dressed [16].
Motivated by all previous trends, lightweight, efficient countermea-
sures, and designs to hinder the malware infection are highly required. As
a result, the mitigation of the malware infection is considered a first step
toward thwarting the success of the malware attacks.
2.2 Applications of Game Theory to Network Security
To enhance and improve the security and the performance of the com-
plicated wireless systems which cannot be modeled using the traditional
methods, a game theoretic approach is introduced. This section provides
an overview of the game theory approach and summarizes some basics and
definitions of the game model along with related work of applications of
game theory to enhance security and the intrusion detection in the mobile
network.
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2.2.1 Game Theory
At first, the game theoretic approach has been used mainly in economics
for the modeling competition among organizations and companies. Then,
it was utilized in other areas including security, politics, and biology. The
game theoretic approach has been recognized recently to enhance and study
the network security and privacy in both wired and wireless networks [34],
[41].
Researchers contributed to the game theory development and wrote
books about it [47], [30], such as John Nash [51] who made fundamental
contributions, best known of which is Nash Equilibrium. Since 1940s, re-
searchers have developed different concepts in game theory, such as a co-
operative game, non-cooperative game, and repeated games.
The game theory proved to be a powerful mathematical and analyt-
ical tool for the study of the security problem in the network. Furthermore,
the game theory addresses the different forms of the network security chal-
lenges and mobile applications, where the players with opposite aims and
goals compete with each other [45].
2.2.2 Game Theoretic Formulation
Game theory focuses on the relationship between the decision-makers in
the game model, then predicts their optimal decisions. A game model con-
sists of three main components: a set of players, a set of strategies or ac-
tions, and utility or payoff function.
A player is a decision maker who acts in a way that outcomes in
mutual or conflicting consequences. Game theory provides the best decision
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techniques that are assuming that the players are rational and they decide
strategically about their actions taking into account the behavior of the
others.
Strategies aim at solving and relieving the problems and providing
the possible solutions. Strategies are categorized as the following.
• Pure strategy: A player chooses to take one action with probability
one.
• Mixed strategy: A player chooses randomly between the available pos-
sible actions. This strategy is defined as a probability distribution
over all the available pure strategy.
• Dominant strategy: A strategy that in any case is the best action cho-
sen by the other players.
Strategic Game definition:
• set of players N={1,.....n}
• each player has a set of possible strategies.
• each player chooses one strategy siεSi
• s = (s1, .......sn) is the vector of strategies for all players called also
strategy profile or state. let S = S1X......XSn
• Utility or payoff for each player: assigns cost or utility to outcomes.
For player i, the cost function or the utility function is:
Ci : S → < or ui : S → <
• Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE): A Strategy vector is a PNE if it is
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Si set of all available strategies to player i
si action of player i
s−i actions of all players not player i
ui payoff to player i
ui(s) payoff of player i when s is played
ui(si, s−i) expected payoff to player i when other players play si
Table 2.1: Strategic game notation
stable such that for every iεN and siεSi:
ui(s) = ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s‘i, s−i)
• Mixed Nash Equilibrium: It is a mixed strategy profile x = (x1, ......., xn),
such that a player could choose a profile based on mixed strategy.
Theorem (Nash’s Theorem [51])
John Nash, as part of his Ph.D. thesis, has proved in 1950 that:
Every game that has a finite strategic form, with finite numbers of
players and a finite number of pure strategies for each player, has at
least one Nash Equilibrium (NE) involving pure or mixed strategies.
• Zero-sum Games is a mathematical representation of a problem in
which each player’s gain (or loss) of utility is exactly balanced by the
losses (or gains) of the utility of the other players. Such that, when
the total benefits of the players are added up, and the total losses are
subtracted, they will sum to zero [26].
∑
iεN ui(x) = 0, for each xεN .
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Two players zero sum games:
u2(x) = - u1(x), for each xεX
Minimax Theorem (John von Neumann) [53]
The optimal strategy to employ is one that maximizes your minimum gain
(or minimizes your maximum possible loss).
The theorems state that for every finite two-person zero-sum game
there exists a strategy for each player, such that if both players employ the
strategy, they will arrive at the same expected payoff. This means that one
player will lose the maximum of the minimum that he expected to lose, and
the other player will win the minimum of maximum he could have possibly
won.
So, in a Maximin strategy you try to maximize your expected payoff
while assuming that given whatever strategy you use, your opponent will
use a strategy that minimizes your expected payoff. In brief, you are trying
to maximize the minimum of your expected payoff.
This thesis assumes that a two-player zero-sum game is a pair of
strategies that a rational pair of decision makers’ might choose to maximize
their payoffs. Each decision maker is rational and knows his actions, form
expectations about any other decision makers’ actions, has preferences, and
chooses his action according to an optimization process.
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2.2.3 Game Theoretic Approach for Network Security
Due to the continuity of the evolution of networks and mobile applications,
the security requirements have revolutionary modified. Theoretical models
play a vital role in network security and provide the tool for modeling sit-
uations where security-related decision makers have to do specific actions
[45].
In such models that target the network security problems, the de-
cision makers play the role of either the attacker or the defender with dif-
ferent aims. An attacker attempts to infringe the security or cause damage
to the network, while the defender tries to evaluate and take enough mea-
sures to improve and enhance the system security design [45]. Accordingly,
game theory has become one of the best analytical tools used for strate-
gic decision making and the design of the efficient security protocols in the
networks.
Since the mobile networks play a vital role in the modern society,
we are facing the evolution of new severe types of security problems and
mobile attacks. Accordingly, the network agents (i.e., users, mobile devices,
software) required being involved in fulfilling the security requirements.
Game theoretic security-related decisions help to allocate limited
resources and estimate the expected risks and loss. Security games are
considered as a special class of games that study the interaction between
malicious attackers and defenders [45].
Security games solutions are applied as a fundamental for formal
decision making and algorithm development as well as for predicting at-
tacker behavior and actions. According to the type of available informa-
tion to the players, the action spaces and the payoff, security games can be
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classified from simple game to more complicated stochastic and incomplete
information game.
Furthermore, they are applied to the security problems ranging
from intrusion detection to privacy in MANET, vehicular, and mobile net-
works [45], [60].
2.2.4 Related Work
This section reviews the state-of-the-art regarding game theoretical ap-
proaches at the intersection between 4 fields: security, routing, intrusion
detection, and Device-to-Device network. This set of work proposed to en-
hance and optimize the intrusion detection.
This section gives a detailed literature review of the examined works
and concludes by comparing this state-of-the-art in a table.
• In [59], Paramasivan et al. proposed an approach that obtains a
threshold value that used to design and develop a secure routing pro-
tocol to detect and find the malicious activities.
They applied a dynamic Bayesian signaling game model to study the
interactions between regular and malicious nodes. The normal nodes
monitored and evaluated their neighbors by using reputation system,
then to update their beliefs using Bayes rule.
This game achieved the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, analyzed dif-
ferent strategies and discussed the importance of focusing on mini-
mizing the malicious node’s payoff and on increasing the normal node’s
payoff when they follow the Nash Equilibrium.
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• In [25], Debjit et al. proposed a game theoretic scheme for efficiently
detecting the malicious nodes that dropped the packets in MANET.
This scheme is based on a modified AODV protocol such that the pack-
ets transmitted through end-to-end least cost path in terms of amount
of idle time only from the source to the destination node.
There is a predefined threshold limit, and once any misbehaving node
reached this limit, it will be isolated from the network. This scheme
proved the smallest idle time and greater availability.
• Bohacek et al. [18] introduced a stochastic routing based on game
theory that mitigates the effects of interception, eavesdropping, and
improves fault tolerance.
They considered zero-sum games between the attacker and the de-
fender by formulating the problem as an optimization problem with
timely cost. They presented two techniques to compute multi-path
routing tables and select among these paths randomly to forward the
packets.
• Bohacek et al. [17] introduced Secure Stochastic Routing Protocol
(SSR) to enhance security by making the eavesdropping and intercep-
tion maximally difficult. This protocol explores multiple paths, and
the packets are forwarded over multiple paths according to a certain
probability.
Accordingly, SSR minimizes the effects of eavesdropping, intercep-
tion, and traffic monitoring attacks and increases the throughput of
the network.
• In [14], Raja Wassem et al. proposed a trust-aware wireless routing
protocol for detection and isolation of malicious nodes in the network.
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This protocol aims at establishing the optimal route with trusted nodes
and forwarding the packets efficiently from the source node to the des-
tination node. This protocol shows high delivery ratio and efficient in
routing overhead in the presence of malicious nodes.
• In [57], Emmanuel et al. proposed secure routing based on game the-
ory. The proposed protocol determines the lowest risk path to forward
the message considering the cost for message forwarding and inspec-
tion and quality of service. They modeled the game as a zero-sum
complete information game between network and attacker. They de-
rived the defender’s strategy for the network to study the security
damage when the attack is succeeded based on complete information.
However, the authors did not consider any dynamic scheme to derive
the defense strategies. They did not consider either the fast malware
evolution or the changes of the detection capabilities of the devices.
The work done in this thesis has been inspired by [57], we extend
the model by considering another security parameter and energy con-
straints in our game model.
• Ribeiro et al. [66] proposed distributed stochastic routing protocol to
find the rate-optimal routes in the wireless multi-hop network. The
proposed protocol matches the random nature of the mobile wireless
network.
They considered three rate optimal criteria, which are practical for
distributed scheme, which includes maximization of the minimum
rate, a weighted sum of the rates, the product of rates, and the source’s
rate.
• In [77], [75], [76], Yu et al. proposed the secure routing and packet
forwarding game is submitted, and they used game theory to study
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the interaction between the good nodes and malicious nodes under
noise and imperfect monitoring.
They derived the optimal defense strategies with extensive evaluation
of the effectiveness of these strategies. The work above considered
only the insider attackers.
• In [72], Swetha. N et al. proposed a dynamic mean field game theo-
retic method for optimal detector algorithm for detecting polymorphic
malware.
Furthermore, they introduced polymorphic signature scheme to ad-
dress the problem of sharing the false evidence from malicious nodes
by studying the interaction among the malicious nodes and legitimate
nodes. This method proved high detection rate and more efficiency.
• Mohi et al. [46] proposed a secure routing protocol that prevents pas-
sive denial of service attacks and enforces node cooperation. This
scheme based on a Bayesian game that studies the interactions be-
tween monitoring devices and nodes of the network.
Local Intrusion Detection System (IDS) monitors the nodes in each
stage of the game using the updated beliefs about the nodes then in-
form the central IDS about the malicious nodes.
Then the central IDS will notify the whole network and local IDS will
isolate the malicious nodes from the routing functions. The number of
dropped packets due to selfish nodes is decreased, while the through-
put of the network is high.
• A. Agah et al. [11] proposed a mechanism for the prevention of DoS at-
tacks. The proposed game theoretic routing protocol aims at detecting
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the non-cooperative nodes that dropped the packets.
They formulated the routing problem as a non-cooperative nonzero-
sum two-player game between an attacker and a network. The nodes
with a bad reputation will be labeled as malicious and placed on the
ignore list; then this list will be broadcasted to the whole network to
isolate these nodes from the network.
• M. Khouzani et al. [39] developed a zero-sum dynamic game model
between the wireless network and the malware to investigate the dy-
namic behavior of the malware over the time and derive the optimal
defense strategy to the network.
They presented a robust defense two phased strategy through dy-
namic choices of patching and reception rates. They proved that these
defense strategies could be implemented on the resource constrained
wireless devices.
The performance evaluations demonstrated that the overall damage
is significantly better than the fixed patching and reception rate.
• Shamshirband et al. [68] proposed a combination between game the-
oretic approach and Fuzzy Q-learning (FQL) algorithm to prevent the
DoS attack. The Fuzzy Q-learning algorithm provides learning pa-
rameters to IDS to recognize the future attacks. Once the attack is
identified, the IDS will be notified of the infected node.
The integration between the FQL and the game theory enhances the
energy efficiency and leads to performance that exceeds any other de-
fense approach.
• M. H. R. Khouzani et al. [40] proposed dynamic zero-sum game method
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to model the strategy of malware’s confrontation and the defense strat-
egy of the wireless network.
They have investigated how the network can dynamically change its
countermeasures parameters to reach a defense strategy (i.e., a rate
of patching) against the spread of malware. They have demonstrated
that there are saddle-point strategies lead to a robust defense strat-
egy.
• In [12], Agah et al. proposed a secure routing protocol aims at pre-
venting the passive denial of service attack by detecting and isolating
the malicious nodes in wireless networks.
They modeled the problem as a repeated game between an intrusion
detection system (IDS) and nodes to identify the malicious nodes that
accept the forwarding of the packets then fail to do it.
The proposed protocol enforces the cooperation among the nodes and
punishment for non-cooperative behavior. Based on the reputation of
the nodes, the IDS will identify the malicious nodes with a negative
reputation and isolate them from participating in the routing func-
tions.
Accordingly, the best-chosen path is the path that consists of less
number of the malicious nodes. To decrease the false alarms of the
IDS, IDS will miss-detect more malicious nodes.
• In [74], Wang et al. analyzed the interactions between malicious
nodes and regular nodes using game theory. They proposed a Bayesian
game with imperfect monitoring to detect the malicious node and the
game achieved the perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in the mixed
strategy.
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Furthermore, after detection, a second game is played, so the regular
node observes the behavior of the malicious node and evaluates the
helpfulness of the malicious node and decides to either keep or iso-
late it. The game achieves the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium under the
mixed strategy.
• M.Felegyhaz et al. [31] presented a game theoretic model to investi-
gate the nodes cooperation using incentive mechanisms in the ad-hoc
wireless network. They proposed a repeated game scheme to study
the Nash Equilibrium of packet forwarding strategies with punish-
ment strategy.
They proved theorems with a very high probability of the Nash Equi-
librium for both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies to detect
the selfish nodes.
• Cho et al. [20] proposed mathematical models based on Stochastic
Petri nets to analyze and discover the optimal rate for IDS tasks to
optimize the mean time to failure of the system.
They also discussed how to improve the reliability of a mission-oriented
group communication system in MANET, given operational conditions,
system failure definitions, and attacker behavior information. They
also discussed how to cope with insider attacks to prolong the system
lifetime.
• Shen et al. [69] proposed a game theoretic model to prevent the prop-
agation of the malware in a wireless network. This model represented
the malware propagation model in seven states.
They formulated a malware-defense differential game between the
network and the malware, such that the network can choose its opti-
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mal defense strategies dynamically to minimize the overall the dam-
age cost, whereas the malware changes its strategies over the time to
maximize the damage cost.
The performance evaluation demonstrated that this approach could
help the network achieve the optimal defense strategies when the
malware varies its strategies dynamically over the time.
• Khouzani et al. [38] formulated a mathematical framework to study
the maximum overall damage of the malware in the mobile wire-
less network when the malware dynamically changes its parameters.
Then they explained how to design the suitable countermeasures given
the damage function of the malware.
Finally, the numerical analysis demonstrated that the damage could
be reduced when the nodes installed the patches at a maximum pos-
sible rate and chose the minimum reception gains.
• Calinescu et al. [19] proposed a stochastic game theoretic model con-
sidering the routing problem between k source and destination pairs.
They formulated a zero-sum game between the attacker and the de-
signer.
The authors proved that the randomized defense strategies could min-
imize the effects of the attacks on the links chosen by the attacker who
aims at increasing congestion on these links.
• Sarkar et al. [67] proposed an energy-efficient stochastic multipath
routing protocol based on game theory for Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
(MANETs). The proposed protocol computes multiple paths between
source and destination node. Then an energy-efficient path is stochas-
tically selected from those paths to forward the packet.
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Also, this protocol provides secure data flow through random paths
from the source node to the destination node in the network. The ran-
dom data traffic paths minimize the jamming, interception, and hi-
jacking data packets because the attacker needs to overhear all avail-
able paths from the source to the destination node. The performance
evaluation demonstrated that the proposed protocol achieved signifi-
cant performance.
We conduct a comparison with the related work based on the game
theory described and mentioned in the details above. Then we conclude by
identifying the contributions of this thesis.
As shown in table 2.2, a set of game theoretic routing protocols aims
at optimizing the routing decision to enhance and improve the intrusion
detection. They target the detection of insider attackers and isolate the
misbehaving and malicious nodes.
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Table 2.2: Comparison with related work
Related work Features Thesis’ contributions
[59] Secure routing protocol
based on a dynamic
Bayesian game aims to




energy constraints of the











attacker, not the insider
selfish and misbehaving
nodes.
[30] Shortest path protocol is
used by applying a





external attacker, not the






forwarding the packets to




of the optimal routes
among all the available
routes and this protocol
considers the energy
constraints of devices
and targets the external
attacker.
[12], [11] Secure routing protocol
for prevention passive
DoS attack as a repeated
game aims to isolate
malicious nodes and the




secure route with highest
detection capabilities is
selected and this protocol
considers the energy
constraints of devices
and targets the external
attacker.
[46] Secure routing protocol
for prevention passive
DoS attack based on a
multistage Bayesian
game model aims to
evaluate the nodes then









and targets the external
attacker.
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All the previous works address the problem of isolating and de-
tecting infected nodes, however, the tracking and isolating of the infected
devices is challenging and still an open research question. We propose a
novel energy-aware end-to-end secure routing protocol that aims at im-
proving the security and hindering the malware attacks than traditional
routing protocols, e.g., DSR, AODV during the infection phase.
Also, table 2.3 conducts another comparison between the proposed
stochastic routing protocols and thesis’ contributions, demonstrating that
the related work addresses only the problems of interception, jamming,
eavesdropping and hijacking. Another set of related work based on game
theory that focuses on optimizing the intrusion detection such as [20], [60],
[56], [42], and [74]. All the previous works aim at coping with malicious
nodes and detecting the misbehaving nodes. While the proposed work [68]
and [72] aims at improving the detection rate of the IDS against malware
attacks. On the other hand, the work that is done in this thesis aims at
hindering the malware attacks against the external attackers.
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Table 2.3: Comparison with stochastic protocols
Related work Features Thesis’ contributions
[67] Energy-efficient
stochastic multipath
protocol based on game
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2.3 Summary
In this chapter, firstly, the overview and fundamental concepts of the D2D
communication, including the characteristics and applications are presented.
Secondly, we have discussed the security requirements and challenges and
issues that arise in the D2D communication and the proposed approach
solving the security problems in the D2D networks. Finally, we have briefly
described the applications of game theoretic approach for the network se-
curity. In the next chapter, we will present the proposed game theoretic
routing protocol for security in D2D network in details.
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Chapter 3
Proposed Secure Routing in D2D network
This chapter introduces the proposed secure routing protocol for D2D com-
munications. This protocol called Repeated Malware-defense Secure Rout-
ing (RMSR).
Section 3.1 describes the system model and its different compo-
nents. It also describes the attack model in details.
Section 3.2 presents the game model called Energy-aware Defense
Routing Game (EDRG) that formulates the interactions between the at-
tacker and the defender then discuss its components. We formulate in this
section the theorem and solution of the game EDRG and describe how to
solve the game EDRG.
Finally, Section 3.3 describes in details the proposed routing proto-
col based on a game theoretic approach called Repeated Malware-defense
Secure Routing (RMSR) and presents in details its different stages.
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3.1 System Description
Due to the real world, mobile cloud-based services face excessive network-
ing latency and longer response time; D2D communications have been used
for such operations that have brought the need for a large amount of mes-
sages transactions between the remote data centers and the edge network.
Mobile-Edge Computing (MEC) [7] offers low latency, high-bandwidth, and
real-time localized services and applications as in paradigms [48], [49],
[64], and [78]. Such that the D2D communication takes place among the
cooperative, mobile devices via the short range wireless technologies (e.g.,
Wi-Fi, ZigBee, Bluetooth).
To motivate our system model, we consider a paradigm in [78] demon-
strating multi-hop D2D communication. The mobile device communicates
with one another in a D2D multi-hop manner by using the short-range
wireless connections (i.e., Wi-Fi) to provide low latency and fast services
so that the communication between devices takes place at the application
layer.
Also, there is a gateway that acts as a hub between the mobile de-
vices in the D2D network and the other world such as a remote data center.
Also, this gateway is exploited to offer several higher-level and low latency
real-time local services to the mobile devices such as local storage and real-
time local data processing.
The gateway provides the management of queries for the mobile
users (e.g., file, information, service) in the D2D network. Accordingly, the
gateway is considered as a trusted device that is responsible for addressing
and handling the localized queries of the mobile users [64].
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3.1.1 Attack Model
As shown in figure 3.1, a malicious device called the attacker compromised
the gateway or replaced it by a fake one [70], [79]. According to this, the
attacker has authorized access (i.e., root access) and can be inside the legit-
imate gateway interacting with the other devices as a trusted device. The
attacker can inject or monitor any traffic once he takes control of gateway.
First, he starts to identify and gather publicly the available infor-
mation from the traffic about his target such as the IP address of the target
and his area of interests through a series of failed and successful attempts
over time to get deeper into the target’s network, and then select which
target devices to infiltrate.
We assume that the attacker aims at infecting a particular device
within the D2D network, depicted as "Target" in figure 3.1. Then, in this
way, the attacker can inject any message attached with malware or use a
zero-day exploit to attack the targeted victim residing in the network to
infect it and compromise its accessibility (i.e., DoS). During the infection
phase, the attacker aims at infecting as much devices as possible to launch
the DoS attack from all the infected devices to increase the damage on the
network.
Furthermore, we assume that all the devices have different intru-
sion detection capabilities and different energy levels. Therefore, all the
available routes from the source to target device have different detection
capabilities to detect malware. Accordingly, from the attacker’s preference,
some routes minimize the chances of detection of malware before it reaches
the targeted device.
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Figure 3.1: Adversarial Model
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3.1.2 Problem Formulation
Let’s assume a multi-hop D2D network ofN trusted mobile devices denoted
by [N ]. We assume that there are no malicious devices in the network. We
denote the source device by S and the targeted device T and refer to any
request or query for file or service or data as message indicated by Q.
When the device S receives Q and need to deliver Q to the device
T , then S must find a route to the targeted device T to forward Q such that
intermediate devices are needed to relay Q towards T . For each T , there is
a set of all routes [R] from the device S to the T device. The S selects rj ∈
[R] to deliver Q, where [Nj] is the set of devices along the route rj.
We consider that software-based malware detection systems with
detection capabilities to be deployed on each device. Every device is run-
ning an anti-malware software, and it can also carry out the real-time net-
work traffic monitoring. We denote by [Mω] the set of Mω as a different
malware available to the attacker to infect mobile devices that run the mo-
bile operating system ω.
For each ω ∈ [Ω], we assume Cω anti-malware software (i.e., Re-
sources) expressed by the finite set [Cω]. Anti-malware detection software
is residing on each mobile device ni and each anti-malware software has its
detection rate to detect successfully certain malware type.
The routing is a cooperative process, where the messages are re-
layed among devices. Any device along the route detects the intrusion with
substantial evidence of anomalies; it is responsible for responding quickly
to the intrusion and taking the appropriate action for future attacks [80].
We denote by B(cik,Mm) (i.e., the True Positive [29]), the capabil-
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ity of the device ni that runs the anti-malware software ck to successfully
detect the malwareMm.
Accordingly, the disability of the device ni to detect the malware
Mm (i.e., False Negative [29]) is, D(cik,Mm) = 1 - B(cik,Mm).
As a result, for the fixed route rj, the disability of rj to detect mal-





Therefore, the route detection capability of rj to successfully detect
malware Mm before it reaches the targeted device T (i.e., True Positive
[29]) is given by:
ψ(rj,Mm) := 1−D(rj,Mm) (3.2)
Also, the multi-hop D2D Communication and malware detection
process will necessitate cooperation between devices. Some devices may not
collaborate to relay other device’s traffic because of their limited available
energy.
Therefore, our protocol guarantees the route availability during the
routing process and considers the energy level of the devices in the routing
decision. It selects the path, where all the intermediate devices along the
chosen route have enough energy levels to participate in the routing pro-
cess.
Formally the energy-level of device ni, ni ∈ [N ] is given by:
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E(ni) = ErEmax
Such that Er is the remaining energy and Emax is the maximum
energy available for the device.
Therefore, the route energy level on rj is derived by multiplying the





3.2 Energy-aware Defense Routing Game (EDRG)
In the previous section, we have described the system and its different
components. In this section, we apply the game theoretical framework to
investigate the interactions between the defender and the adversary.
We consider a non-cooperative two-players zero-sum game played
by the D2D network (i.e., defender) and the opponent (i.e., the attacker)
to derive the optimal strategic routing decisions for the defender. The de-
fender aims at selecting the optimal route to deliver Q to T , while the at-
tacker aims at infecting the targeted device T and then launching a DoS
attack. This game is repeated every time for tmax.
We assume that the defender has the probability distribution of
different existing malware types for each mobile platform. Furthermore,
the mobile devices learn more about the attacker actions from the Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) residing on mobile devices during the subsequently
repeated game.
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3.2.1 Strategies and Payoffs
• Strategy set: The strategy set of a player refers to all possible moves
the player can take.
We consider that the defender’s pure strategies are a finite action set
of all possible routes rj ∈ [R] from the S device to T device. The at-
tacker’s pure strategy is a finite action set of different malware types
Mm ∈ [Mω] from which the attacker selects to send to T aiming its
infection.
In the game EDRG, a pure strategy profile is a pair of defender and
attacker actions, (rj,Mm).
• Payoff: The defender’s preferences or criteria of optimality are speci-
fied by its payoff function or utility function.
For a given pure strategy profile (rj,Mm), we define the UΘ as the
payoff of the defender; that depends on the route detection capability
of each malware type and the route energy-level. We define UΨ as
the payoff of the attacker, where the attacker’s payoff is opposite to
defender’s payoff (i.e., zero sum game).
We consider the defender is the row player in the payoff matrix and
the attacker is the column player as shown in table 3.1.
For a given pure strategy profile (rj,Mm), rj ∈ [R],Mm ∈ [Mω], the
payoff of the defender is given by:
UΘ(rj,Mm) = [ψ(rj,Mm)V + E(rj)] (3.4)
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Table 3.1: Payoff matrix example
M1 M2 M3 M4
r1 3,-3 1,-1 1,-1 2,-2
r2 2,-2 0,0 1,-1 0,0
r3 1,-1 1,-1 3,-3 2,-2
r4 0,0 2,-2 1,-1 1,-1
where the first term represents the route detection capability, the
V is the defender’s security gain value (monetary), where V > 0 and the
second term represents the overall route energy level.
The defender’s payoff is the expected gain of detecting the malware
before infecting the targeted device depends on the route detection capabil-
ity summed up the route energy level.
In two-player zero-sum games with a finite number of actions for
both players, there is at least a Nash Equilibrium (i.e., optimal routing
strategy) in mixed strategy [50]. When there are some of the player’s
strategies obviously are optimal and more beneficial than the others, so
it is better to assign higher probabilities to these strategies.
Accordingly, how to create mixed strategies such that each player
can play one of his pure strategies with a certain probability?
To derive the optimal defense routing strategies, we consider the
mixed strategy of both decision makers. The defender’s mixed strategy X =
[x1, x2, . . . , xξ] is the probability distribution over different routes in [R] (i.e.,
pure strategies) from the S device to T device. Where xj is the probability
that the defender will choose its j-th route to deliver Q .
The attacker’s mixed strategies Y = [y1, y2, . . . , yη] is the probability
distribution over different malware (i.e., pure strategies) against targeted
devices. Where yl is the probability that the attacker will choose its l-th
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malware to infect device.
The game consists of mixed strategy profile (X, Y ), therefore the
payoff of the defender is denoted by:











For zero-sum games, the defender’s strategy guarantees his payoff
of value (V) regardless of attacker’s strategy, and similarly, the attacker
can guarantee himself a payoff of value (-V). The maximin means that the
defender maximizes the minimum payoff possible for the attacker. Because
the game is zero-sum, he also maximizes his minimum gain [52]. This
means that the defender’s gain is considered the attacker’s loss.
For a zero-sum game, UΨ = - UΘ, this means that the defender’s gain
is considered the attacker’s loss.
Theorem 1:
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3.2.2 Solution of EDRG
The minimax theorem states that the minimax solution in zero-sum games
matches the NE. This means that the NE represents the optimal defense
routing strategies against the attacker. On the other words, regardless of
the attacker strategy, the optimal defense strategies of the defender guar-
antee the maximum performance [52].
For mixed strategy profile (X∗, Y ∗) is the mixed Nash Equilibrium
if:
• UΘ(X∗, Y ∗) ≥ UΘ(X, Y ∗); in case the attacker chooses Y ∗
On the other hand, the maximin solution is the maximin strategy








Linear Programming (LP) can take a problem where the idea is to opti-
mize a specific value given certain constraints for that value. There is a
mathematical approach that is a branch of Linear programming called the
simplex method.
Therefore, a game payoff matrix can be converted to an LP problem
and applied to the simplex algorithm to derive the Nash Equilibrium (i.e.,
mixed strategies) for the game [35].
Fact A Linear Programming can be solved in Polynomial Time.
CHAPTER 3. PROPOSED SECURE ROUTING IN D2D NETWORK 58
Example 3.2.2 describes the output of the simplex method after explaining
the game (i.e., mixed strategies of the defender and the attacker).
Example 3.2.2
X = [ 0.6, 0, 0.4, 0]
This vector refers to the mixed strategy of the defender, which rep-
resents the probability distribution over the available routes. The defender
will forward 60% of the data traffic over r1 and 40% of the data traffic over
r3.
3.3 Repeated Malware-defense Secure Routing Protocol
In the previous section, we have described the game model and formulated
the zero-sum game between network and attacker. We have also introduced
the game solution and how to compute the optimal strategies.
In this section, we present the proposed routing protocol, which is
called Repeated Malware-defense Secure Routing Protocol (RMSR).
RMSR has characteristics of reactive protocols and was mainly in-
spired by the functionalities of reactive protocols, which means that Route
Discovery stage is used for route finding – on Demand as well as the source
route is included in the packet header.
It consists of three main stages: Route Discovery stage, Route Se-
lection stage, and Message Forwarding stage and we describe each stage in
details as the following.
CHAPTER 3. PROPOSED SECURE ROUTING IN D2D NETWORK 59







3.3.1 Route Discovery stage
In this section, we describe in details the first stage of the proposed RMSR
protocol, which is the Route Discovery stage, which consists of two parts.
First, the S needs to find the route to the targeted device T . S first
broadcasts the Route Request (RREQ) [36] as shown in 3.2 towards the
targeted device T .
Each intermediate device decides if to accept and forward the RREQ
or not depending on its energy level. If it is less than a threshold value, the
intermediate device will either drop the RREQ message or the message is
forwarded towards the targeted device T .
As a result, this will guarantee that all intermediate devices have
enough energy levels along the route to forward the message and partici-
pate in the routing process.
When T receives RREQ, it prepares the Route Reply message (RREP)
as shown in table 3.3 and puts the reverse route then sends back to the S.
Figure 3.2 shows the flow chart part (I) from this stage briefly.
When T sends back the RREP on the opposite route, each inter-
mediate device receiving the RREP updates the route detection rate field
by multiplying its detection capabilities using equation 3.2 and updates the
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Figure 3.2: Route Discovery stage Part (I)
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route energy level field by multiplying its energy level using equation 3.3.
When the Route Reply reaches S, S stores it in the routing table.
S collects several routes to the device T . Then S will use the gathered
information in its routing table in the next stage. Figure 3.3 shows the
flowchart part (II) from this stage briefly.
3.3.2 Route Selection stage
After S receives several routes from the Route Discovery stage, then stores
the gathered information in its routing table for deriving the optimal rout-
ing strategy. The Route Selection stage begins by using the collected in-
formation to obtain the optimal routing strategies as discussed in section
3.2.
After calculating the mixed strategy, S saves the routes for cache
time tmax, then selects the optimal route stochastically according to the de-
rived optimal routing strategy to forward the message Q. When the device
S selects the route stochastically, the next Message Forwarding stage be-
gins.
S must cache these routes for tmax, and after tmax, new optimal rout-
ing strategy must be derived. This means that EDRG is needed to be re-
CHAPTER 3. PROPOSED SECURE ROUTING IN D2D NETWORK 62
Start Part II
Target sends back

















ther to Source node
No
Yes
Figure 3.3: Route Discovery stage Part (II)
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peated every tmax because the mobile devices learn more about the attacker
actions and behaviors from the Intrusion Detection System and the game
history.
During tmax, if there are no more valid routes in the cache due to en-
ergy depletion of devices, the Route Discovery procedure must be initiated,
and EDRG will be repeated to derive the correct routes.
3.3.3 Message Forwarding stage
Once the device S selected the route, the Message Forwarding stage started
as the following:
Each intermediate device along the chosen route received the mes-
sageQ participated in detecting the occurrence of these malicious messages
with strong evidence of anomalies; it will respond quickly to the intrusion
and take the appropriate action for future attacks.
Accordingly, if it finds a malicious message, it will drop it. Oth-
erwise, it will forward it towards the device T . The following figure 3.4
summarizes all the stages:
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Algorithm 1 Repeated Malware-defense Secure Routing
procedure RMSR(Sourcenode(S), Targetnode(T ), Query Q)
ROUTE DISCOVERY Stage (Part I)
S broadcasts a Route Request message(RREQ);
if ni node receives RREQ then
if ni is not T then
ni should broadcast RREQ to their neighbors;
else
T sends back the Route Reply (RREP) containing the full reverse
source route
ROUTE DISCOVERY Stage (Part II)
if ni device receives RREP then . Intermediate Nodes
if ni is not S then
D(rj ,Mm)← D(rj ,Mm) ∗D(cik,Mm);
E(rj)← E(rj) ∗ E(ni);
Then appended two new fields in the RREP
(route detection capability, route energy-level).
if ni is S then
ψ(rj ,Mm)← 1−D(rj ,Mm);
After the S receives several routes, stores its routing table.
ROUTE SELECTION Stage:
First← S uses its routing table to compute the payoff matrix then derive
the optimal defense plan using LP
Second ← S selects the route R probabilistically according to optimal
defense plan to forward the message.
MESSAGE FORWARDING Stage:
Each node belongs to route R inspect Q;
if ni found malicious message then
ni will drop message ;
else
ni relays the message to T ;
Figure 3.4: RMSR protocol stages
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3.4 Summary
In this chapter, firstly, the system model of the network with mobile de-
vices and the attack model were described. Secondly, we have formulated
the problem between the network and the attacker as a zero-sum non-
cooperative game by presenting the payoff functions for both decision mak-
ers then proving theoretically the optimality of game solution.
Finally, we have described the proposed game theoretical routing
protocol in details in each stage and summarized the overall routing proto-
col in an algorithm.
In the next chapter, we present the simulation results of the pro-
posed game theoretic routing protocol. We demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed game theoretic routing protocol regarding malware detec-
tion efficiency and energy awareness in D2D network. The performance of
the proposed protocol is also shown practically against different attackers’
behavior in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Simulation Results and Discussion.
In this chapter, we validate the theoretical analysis conducted in Chapter
3 and evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed game theoretic routing
protocol in Device-to-Device network through extensive simulations. The
simulations are performed using the Omnet++ network simulator and the
INET framework.
Then, we evaluate the performance of the optimal routing strate-
gies of the defender against three different attacks distribution: Uniform
Attack, Optimal Attack, and Weighted Attack.
We compare the proposed routing protocol practically regarding the
detection rate and the overall expected payoff of the defender with the tra-
ditional routing protocols (e.g., AODV, DSR) and strategic customized pro-
tocol SCP.
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4.1 Network setup
We have performed the simulations using the Omnet++ network simulator
and the INET framework. We have considered that a D2D network consists
of 20 mobile devices, each is equipped with anti-malware software to detect
malicious messages.
In these simulations, the mobile devices are randomly deployed in-
side a rectangular area of 800 x 800 m. Such that each mobile device has
fixed transmission power with a maximum transmission range 200 meters
and the mobile devices send (UDP) traffic.
The total simulation time varies from (10, 20, 40, 60 mins) to prove
the accuracy of the results. Table 4.1 summarizes the simulation fixed pa-
rameters.
Table 4.1: Simulation parameter values
Parameter Value
Number of nodes 20
Mobility model Linear Mobility
Mobility Speed 10mps
Mobility Update Interval 0.1s
Packet generation rate 2 packets/s
Packet size 512 bytes
4.2 Anti-malware software and Malware
We assume anti-malware software as shown in table 4.2 with their detec-
tion rates, such that each mobile device is equipped with anti-malware soft-
ware.
We consider one attacker in our simulations who aims at infecting
a targeted device residing in D2D network. The attacker has a finite set
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Table 4.2: Anti-malware software





of different malware types Mm ∈ [Mω] from which the attacker selects to
send to targeted device T aiming at its infection. We assume the attacker
chooses one of these malware types: keylogger, Spam, Rootkit iSAM, Spy-
ware, iKee-B, Premium-Rate [21], [22], [23], and [24].
4.3 Attack Distribution Cases
We consider in the simulations three different attacks distribution to eval-
uate the effectiveness of the proposed routing protocol.
We simulate three different attack distribution, each attack case
defines the attacker preferences.
• Uniform attack distribution: the attacker gives no preferences to any
malware type, this means that all malware types are chosen with
equal probability. This approach assumes that the attacker has no
knowledge about the capability of the intrusion detection in the net-
work to decide which malware type will be difficult to detect.
• Optimal attack distribution: the attacker gives preferences to certain
malware types to maximize his payoff. He chooses the malware type
according to his mixed strategy (i.e., Nash Equilibrium) assigned by
the minimax solution.
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• Weighted attack distribution: the attacker gives preferences to certain
malware types to maximize his payoff (i.e., proportional to his payoff).
He chooses the malware type according to the following [58].
STEP ONE: For each column in payoff matrix, the average payoff value
of the column is computed.
STEP TWO: Add the total average payoff value of the all the columns
to derive the total sum.
STEP THREE: For each column (i.e., Malware type), the probability
distribution for each malware type is calculated by dividing its aver-
age payoff value derived from step one by the total sum obtained from
step two.
4.4 Performance Analysis
In this section, we first perform a practical study to validate and prove our
theoretical analysis of optimality. We conduct simulations to test the ef-
fectiveness of the optimal routing strategies and how they perform against
different attacks distribution created by Uniform, Optimal, and Weighted
approaches.
We compare practically first the performance of the optimal rout-
ing strategies of proposed routing protocol, which are given by the Nash
Equilibrium after solving the security game with the other two determin-
istic non-strategic protocols (i.e., DSR and AODV) against three different
attacks distribution.
Then, we compare the performance of the optimal routing strate-
gies of the proposed routing protocol with another strategic customized
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routing protocol against various attacks distribution.
Through simulations, the theoretical results are illustrated, demon-
strating how each routing protocol performs regarding overall expected pay-
off and detection rate.
• Overall Expected value of payoff: it involves maximizing the expected
value of objective or payoff function regarding malware detection ef-
ficiency and route energy awareness. This term refers to what the
defender will get or gain based on a certain decision taken by the de-
fender and the attacker, (i.e., expected value in reaching optimal deci-
sions regarding malware detection efficiency and route energy aware-
ness) as shown in the example 4.4.
Example 4.4
Given the payoff matrix of Rock-Paper-Scissors zero-sum game as
shown in table 4.3. The vectors of mixed strategies of the game as
given by:
X=[1/2 , 1/2, 0]
Y=[1/3, 2/3, 0]
therefore, the overall expected payoff is computed as follows:
UD(X, Y )=(1/2 * 1/3 * 0) + (1/2 * 2/3 * -1) + (1/2 * 0 * 1) + (1/2 * 1/3 * 1)
+ (1/2 * 2/3 * 0) + (1/2 * 0 * -1) + (0 * 1/3 * -1) + (0 * 2/3 * 1) + (0 * 0 *
0) = -1/6.
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Table 4.3: Rock-Paper-Scissors game example
M1 M2 M3
r1 0,0 -1,1 1,-1
r2 1,-1 0,0 -1,1
r3 -1,1 1,-1 0,0
4.4.1 Performance Comparisons
Firstly, we plot the overall expected payoff and the detection rate of the
proposed protocol RMSR and other two traditional non-strategic protocols
against three different attacks distribution: Uniform, Optimal, and Weighted.
Then, we plot the overall expected payoff of the defender and the




– When comparing the proposed RMSR protocol with the other
two deterministic protocols as shown figure 4.1a, we can see
that the proposed RMSR protocol achieves its highest detec-
tion rate 83% against the Uniform attack distribution.
– While in the case of Optimal attack distribution as shown
figure 4.1b, the proposed protocol RMSR has detection rate
15% greater than DSR and 32 % higher than AODV.
– We can also see in figure 4.2, that the proposed RMSR proto-
col achieves its highest detection rate 70% against the Weighted
attack distribution.
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(a) Detection rate against Uniform Attack
(b) Detection rate against Optimal Attack
Figure 4.1: Malware detection rate for 3 routing protocols against Uniform
and Optimal Attack
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Figure 4.2: Detection rate against Weighted Attack
2. Overall Expected Payoff
Similarly, the proposed protocol RMSR achieves the best perfor-
mance regarding overall expected payoff among the other two
traditional routing protocols.
– We can see in figure 4.3a the percentage improvement of the
proposed protocol RMSR against the Optimal attack distri-
bution by 52% and 72% compared to the DSR and AODV re-
spectively.
– While in the case of the Uniform attack distribution as shown
figure 4.3b, the percentage improvement values of the pro-
posed protocol are 63% and 78% compared to the DSR and
AODV respectively.
– In figure 4.4, we can see the percentage improvement val-
ues of the proposed protocol are 40% and 52% compared to
the DSR and AODV respectively against the Weighted attack
distribution.
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Although the proposed protocol RMSR is stochastic, however, it
outperforms the other two deterministic protocols in case of all
attacks distribution.
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(a) Overall Expected Payoff against Optimal Attack
(b) Overall Expected Payoff against Uniform Attack
Figure 4.3: Expected Payoff of the defender for 3 routing protocols against
Uniform and Optimal Attack
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Figure 4.4: Overall Expected Payoff against Weighted Attack
Table 4.4: Payoff matrix for zero-sum game
M1 M2 M3
r1 1,-1 2,-2 0,0
r2 3,-3 1,-1 3,-3
r3 1,-1 0,0 2,-2
• Strategic Customized Protocol
To evaluate and prove the optimality of our proposed protocol RMSR,
we present another strategic customized routing protocol called SCP.
Given that the probability distribution of different existing malware
types, we develop strategic customized routing protocol, which pro-
vides the optimal proportion routes to their average capabilities of
malware detection.
This protocol is as the following algorithm [58]:
STEP ONE: The average payoff value is calculated as equation 4.1 for
each route.





,∀rj ∈ [R] (4.1)





Θ (rj), ∀rj ∈ [R]
STEP THREE: Then the probability of route rj to be selected to relay





, ∀rj ∈ [R] (4.2)
1. Detection Rate
– When comparing the proposed RMSR protocol with the cus-
tomized SCP protocol as shown figure 4.5a, the proposed pro-
tocol RMSR outperforms the SCP protocol and achieves a de-
tection rate 25% higher than SCP against the Uniform attack
distribution.
– While in the case of Optimal attack distribution as shown in
figure 4.5b, the proposed protocol RMSR achieves a detection
rate 19% higher than SCP.
– In figure 4.6, we can see that the proposed RMSR protocol
achieves a detection rate 13% higher than SCP against the
Weighted attack distribution.
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(a) Detection rate against Uniform Attack
(b) Detection rate against Optimal Attack
Figure 4.5: Malware detection rate for RMSR and SCP against 2 attack
cases
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Figure 4.6: Detection rate against Weighted Attack
2. Overall Expected Payoff
As shown figure 4.7, we can see that the proposed protocol RMSR
performs better than SCP regarding overall expected payoff against
two different attack cases.
– In figure 4.7a, we can see the percentage improvement of the
proposed protocol RMSR against the Uniform attack distri-
bution by 31% compared to SCP.
– While in the case of the Optimal attack distribution as shown
in figure 4.7b, the percentage improvement values of the pro-
posed protocol RMSR are 89% compared to SCP.
– Also, we can see in figure 4.8 the percentage improvement
of the proposed protocol RMSR against the weighted attack
distribution by 29% compared to SCP.
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(a) Overall Expected Payoff against Uniform Attack
(b) Overall Expected Payoff against Optimal attack
Figure 4.7: Overall Expected Payoff of the defender for RMSR and SCP
against Uniform and Optimal Attack
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Figure 4.8: Overall Expected Payoff against Weighted Attack
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we firstly introduced the network simulation environment:
one external attacker is trying to attack the D2D network which consists
of N devices. Where, each device is equipped with IDS to detect certain
malware type. In this study, we considered a smart and a rational attacker
who can choose his strategy intelligently to maximize his payoff.
Secondly, we presented different attacks distribution which is used
for comparison and evaluation. Then we introduced the simulation results
to validate the analytical results discussed in chapter 3.
Finally, through simulation, we evaluated the effectiveness and the
performance of the proposed game theoretic protocol in D2D network and
compared it with the other traditional routing protocols and strategic cus-
tomized protocol against different attacks distribution.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we conclude this thesis by explaining our results and find-
ings. Then, we demonstrate the research achievements and highlight the
main contributions of the thesis on the objectives of the research.
We also emphasize the limitations and the challenges of this re-
search. Then, we mention the main avenues for future research orienta-
tion in the field of security for Device-to-Device communications and pro-
vide several suggestions and recommendations for future work as well as
speculations on future trends.
5.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, our most significant contributions fall within the area of se-
cure routing in intelligent Device-to-Device communications. The primary
objective is to propose energy-aware solutions for security in Device-to-
Device communications to hinder the malware attacks during the infection
phase in the presence of the external attacker.
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Firstly, we investigated the main research areas of the security in
Device-to-Device communications and identified the security requirements,
issues, and challenges. Also, we reviewed the evolution of the malware
attacks and mobile devices’ capabilities.
Secondly, we reviewed in details the state-of-the-art in the fields of
malware attacks, intrusion detection, and secure routing in D2D network,
then concluded by a comparison with our proposed routing protocol.
Thirdly, to obtain optimal routing strategies, we formulated the se-
curity game to model the interactions between the attacker and the D2D
network. The interactions presented using the payoff function and payoff
matrix. Then, we proposed a novel game-theoretic energy-aware routing
protocol for enhancing the security in D2D network. To the best of our
knowledge, stochastic routing for mitigating the malware infection as well
as considering the energy constraints has not been suggested in D2D com-
munications.
Finally, we designed and performed the simulations to evaluate the
performance and the effectiveness of the proposed game theoretic routing
protocol against three different attacks distribution. We demonstrated that
the game has the Nash Equilibrium leading to optimal routing strategy.
The simulation results showed that with the optimal routing strat-
egy, the defender could pick the intelligently the optimal energy-aware
routes that enhance the security and maximize the chances of the malware
detection.
The simulation results indicated that the proposed protocol based
on strategic plan outperforms the other non-strategic traditional protocols
and another strategic customized protocol. Unlike the existing works on
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security games, the proposed protocol can make optimal routing decisions
to deliver the traffic from source to target device in D2D network. Both the
security requirements and the energy constraints were considered in the
proposed routing protocol.
5.2 Future Work
One of the limitations of our contribution is the assumption that there are
no malicious devices. In the case of malicious internal devices that have
control on the IDS, there is no trust guarantee among the devices.
Also, one of the considerations in this thesis is that we have con-
sidered the minimum mobility of the devices. In the case of high mobility,
we would like to discuss distributed stochastic routing protocol in a hop-to-
hop manner instead of end-to-end manner, such that each device selects a
neighbor to forward a packet according to a probability distribution.
Accordingly, in our future work, we would like to consider that each
device evaluates its neighbor and will try to find the next hop to forward
the message.
In future research, we would also like to design and develop a more
robust game theoretic scheme to cope with the other advanced attacker’s
strategies such that the pure strategy of the attacker consists of is a mal-
ware type and set of devices to infect. This new game theoretic scheme
should be applied to handle this case.
We would also like to consider the cops and robbers N-players game
approach for routing in D2D network. In this scheme, for a given period,
some devices act as n-cops are equipped with IDS that chases robber, then
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it will be shown how many cops are needed to catch the robber.
Also, in our future research, we plan to combine both the game
theoretic approach with Fuzzy Q-learning algorithm [1] in D2D network.
It will improve the detection accuracy rate of the devices over the time due
to the learning capabilities of the devices as well as detect new, different
attacks.
It is expected that by merging the game theory with a Fuzzy Q-
learning method, the performance of the new scheme will outperform that
any other defense method.
As our proposed routing protocol has assumed that the decision
makers have complete information about each other’s payoff matrix, which
is not valid practically [54]. Accordingly, we plan to formulate security
games with imperfect observations as a fictitious play game. The fictitious
play game is a “belief-based” learning rule, so each decision maker forms
beliefs about opponent’s mixed strategy, then compute the best strategy on
these beliefs [6].
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You can summarize here the symbols used in this thesis as shown in table
A.1 and the EDRG game notations as shown in table A.2
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Table A.1: List of symbols
Symbol Description




[R] set of available routes from S to T
rj j-th route
[Nj] set of devices along rj
ni i-th device
E(ni) Energy-level of device ni
E(rj) Route energy-level on rj
Er Remaining energy for a device
Emax Maximum energy available for a device
ω Operating system
Ω set of mobile operating systems
Mm m-th malware
[Cω] set of anti-malware controls
that runs ω
[Mω] set of malware that infects a
device that runs ω
B(cik,Mm) Capability of the device ni that runs the
anti-malware software ck to successfully
detect the malwareMm.
D(cik,Mm) Disability of the device ni to detect
malwareMm
D(rj,Mm) Disability of route rj to detectMm
ψ(rj,Mm) Capability of route rj to successfully
detectMm before it reaches T
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Table A.2: EDRG game notations
Symbol Description
UΘ(rj,Mm) Payoff of the defender with pure strategy
profile
UΨ Payoff of the attacker
V Defender’s security gain value
X Defender’s mixed strategy
Y Attacker’s mixed strategy
xj Probability that defender will choose j-th
route
yl Probability that defender will choose l-th
malware to infect device
UΘ(X, Y ) Payoff of the defender with mixed
strategy profile
X∗ Defender’s Nash Equilibrium
Y ∗ Attacker’s Nash Equilibrium
UΘ(X
∗, Y ∗) Payoff of the defender with Nash
Equilibrium
UΨ(X
∗, Y ∗) Payoff of the attacker with Nash
Equilibrium
Appendix B
Two-Person Zero Sum Games
Definition: Two players zero sum games [26]
u2(x) = - u1(x) for each x ∈ X, valid for all x strategies.
Representation as one matrix M ∈ RmXn
In pure profile (i, j):
player 1 has aij utility and player 2 has utility of - aij.












Using linear programming to solve the optimization problem in
polynomial time.
Given vector c ∈ Rn, matrix M ∈ RnXm and vector b ∈ Rm
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Find x ∈ Rn that satisfies M . x ≤ b and maximizes cT . x
Assume player 1 chooses xi first then player 2 chooses the best re-
sponse x2 against xi.
In the best response x2, x2j > 0 only if the expected utility of strat-
egy j is minimal.












The utility of player 1:
V ≤∑mi=1 x1i.aij for j=1 . . . n
so player 1 wants to maximize V . So player 1 chooses x1 in order to
maximize V .




i=1 x1i.aij ≤ 0, for j=1 . . . n.∑m
i=1 x1i=1, for i=1 . . .m.
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